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Shedding Tiers "Above and Beyond" the Federal
Floor: Loving State Constitutional Equality Rights to
Death in Louisiana*
Robert F. Williams-
The latest trend in American constitutional law is to use
"equal protection" as a concept not to eliminate
discrimination, but to justify it. As a nation, we all now have
collective amnesia.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Equality doctrine in state constitutional law has been important
for many years. Within this larger context, Louisiana constitutional
equality doctrine is important because the state of Louisiana added an
equal protection clause to its state constitution in 1974.2 Article I,
section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution, the "Individual Dignity
Clause," provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or
religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against
a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and
involuntary servitude areProhibited, except in the latter case
as punishment for crime.
In 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted this provision
in Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Incorporated v. State
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* "Art. I, Sec. 3 was intended to provide to the citizens of this state equal
protection of the laws above and beyond that protected under the federal
Constitution ...... Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669
So. 2d 1185, 1198 (La. 1996) (emphasis added).
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law,
Camden, New Jersey. This article is based on a presentation made by the author at
the conference, "Is Civil Rights Law Dead?" held at Louisiana State University
School of Law, March 13-14, 2003.
1. Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1185,
1203 (La. 1996) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
2. Louis "Woody" Jenkins, The Declaration ofRights, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 16
(1975); Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1974).
3. La. Const. art I, § 3 (1974).
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of Louisiana, [Louisiana Associated General Contractors] to
outlaw all forms of affirmative action which include race as a
factor.' John Devlin has provided an in-depth look at this case in
the context of Louisiana's state constitutional history (or lack
thereof) of equality.5 Louisiana Associated General Contractors
should be evaluated on its own terms as well as in the broader
context of state constitutional rights protections. Devlin's article
provides both of these perspectives. I will add a few thoughts of my
own.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY DOCTRINE
Since the equal protection revolution of the Warren Court, state
courts have tended to lose sight of the rich and varied equality
provisions contained in their own state constitutions. Many state
courts were mesmerized by the doctrines developed by the United
States Supreme Court as it interpreted the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These courts virtually ignored the
following kinds of equality guarantees, often not contained in the
Declaration of Rights, in their state constitutions:
1) The 1776-type provisions declaring that "[a]ll men
are free and equal .... "6 Also included in this category are
the less common types of clauses stating that government
was created for the "common benefit" of its citizens. Based
on such a clause, the Vermont Supreme Court in 1999
declared that the state had to permit either marriage or
domestic partnership for same-sex couples.7
4. 669 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1996). The Court rejected an argunent that the case
was moot. Many questions ofjudicial enforcement, such as justiciability, standing,
ripeness and mootness, are often much more loosely applied under state
constitutions. For a thoughtful, in-depth treatment of these matters, see Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues:" Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833 (2001). See also Barbara Kritchevsky,
Justiciability in Tennessee, Part One: Principles and Limits, 15 Mem. St. U. L.
Rev. 1 (1984); Justiciability in Tennessee, Part Two: Standing, 15 Mem. St. U. L.
Rev. 179 (1985); Justiciability in Tennessee, Part Three: Timing, 16 Mem. St. U.
L. Rev. 177 (1986).
5. John Devlin, Louisiana Associated General Contractors: A Case Study in
the Failure of a State Equality Guarantee to Further the Transformative Vision of
Civil Rights, 63 La. L. Rev. 887 (2003).
6. Devlin, supra note 5; Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1199-1200 (1985).
7. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). See generally Robert F.
Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons from Vermont's
State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 73
(2001).
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2) The state constitutional provisions dating from the
Jacksonian period, which took aim at government grants of
special privileges.'
3) The provisions dating from the 1870's placing
limitations on the legislative branch's ability to enact "special
laws."9
4) The state constitutional provisions requiring
uniformity in taxation.'
5) The state constitutional provisions requiring either
thorough and efficient or uniform free public schools."
6) The state constitutional provisions barring
discrimination against citizens in their exercise of civil
rights.
12
7) The state equal rights amendments ("state ERAs")
adopted to provide equal rights for women.13
An examination of the Louisiana constitution makes it very clear
that the 1974 "Individual Dignity Clause" is not the only equality
clause to be found in that constitutional document. For example,
article I, section 1, dating from 1921, provides that "[a]ll government,
of right, originates with the people... and is instituted. .for the
good of the whole."14 Article I, section 12, also added in 1974,
prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on similar
grounds as those listed in the Individual Dignity Clause." Article II,
section 12 prohibits the enactment of special laws by the legislature
in an enumerated list of categories. 6 Article VII, section 18 (A)
requires uniformity in property taxation.' 7 In the Preamble to the
8. Williams, supra note 6, at 1206-08.
9. Id. at 1209-10; Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter (Again): The
Prohibition Against Special Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 Widener J.
Pub. L. 161 (1993).
10. Williams, supra note 6, at 1216; Robert F. Williams, A "Row ofShadows:"
Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Approach to its State Constitutional Equality
Doctrine, 3 Widener J. Pub. L. 343, 353-57 (1993).
11. Williams, supra note 6, at 1214-16; Williams, supra note 10, at 357-61.
12. Williams, supra note 6, at 1210-12; Williams, supra note 10, at 361-69.
13. Williams, supra note 6, at 1212-14; Williams, supra note 10, at 369-73;
Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Continuing Developments in State Constitutional
Law, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 573, 575 (2001).
14. Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution-A Reference Guide 21
(1991) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 51-52.
17. Id. at 133. "Unequal application of the state taxes resulted from a lack of
uniformity of assessment practices. This section was designed to provide statewide
uniformity by requiring assessors, still locally elected officials under section 24, to
assess property at the same percentage of value throughout the state." Id.
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Education Article, article VIII, one of the goals of the public educational
system is "that every individual maybe afforded an equal opportunity to
develop to his full potential.' 8 The Individual Dignity Clause includes
a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex, making it also a state
ERA.' 9 Thus, even before 1974, the Louisiana Constitution illustrated the
point made by Paul Kahn: "no state constitution is indifferent to the
principle of equality, even if the state text does not have an equalprotection clause.". 2
Each of these types of provisions is different from the federal equal
protection clause, and should be interpreted according to its own text,
history, and purpose. In other words, these kinds of clauses should be
interpreted by the courts independently from the federal equal protection
doctrine. Many state courts, however, have failed to accord these
provisions their proper recognition, choosing instead to treat them
separately, or sometimes lump them together, and apply the federal equal
protection doctrine.
2
'
Throughout the process of including these sorts of equality
provisions, a number of states, including Louisiana in 1974, added
"equal protection" clauses to their constitutions. 22 When Louisiana
included the equal protection provision in its new, revised constitution
it is fair to ask whether it was leading its citizens by recognizing a new
legal doctrine, or, rather if it was following its citizens by adopting a
provision that reflected a change that had already taken place in society.
In the words of Willard Hurst, provisions included in state constitutions
often "did not direct, but merely recorded, the currents of social
change.'23 John Devlin has argued very convincingly that this 1974
provision came after a substantial portion of the Civil Rights Movement
had taken place and therefore may have "recorded" a change that had
already taken place in at least some segments of society.24
18. Id. at 145 (emphasis added). In 1985, the courts of Louisiana ruled that this
Preamble was not self-executing and had little substantive effect. Simmons v.
Sowela Technical Inst., 470 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied 475 So. 2d
1109 (La. 1985).
19. La. Const. art. I, § 3 (1974).
20. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation andAuthority in State Constitutionalism, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 1147, 1159-60 (1993).
21. See Robert F. Williams, Foreword.- The Importance of an Independent
State Constitutional Equality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24
Conn. L. Rev. 675 (1992); Williams, supra note 10, at 346-48; Williams, supra
note 6, at 1197, 1219.
22. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution ofEquality in State Constitutional Law,
34 Rutgers L. J. (forthcoming 2004).
23. James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers 246
(1950) (emphasis added).
24. Devlin, supra note 5, at 899-903. It has been reported that because the
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Although many state courts were mesmerized by federal equal
protection analysis, some, by contrast, began to take note of the
variety of equality-based provisions in their own state constitutions,
each with a text, history and purpose different from the federal equal
protection clause. These courts embarked on an independent analysis,
sometimes reaching decisions beyond the national lowest common
denominator, or "federal floor," enforced by the United States
Supreme Court.25
II. LOUISIANA EQUALITY DOCTRINE
The history of Louisiana's judicial interpretation of article I,
section 3 reflects a transition between the two approaches, following
federal doctrine and independent interpretation, observable in state
courts. Initially, right after the adoption of the provision of 1974, the
court interpreted it to be the same as the federal equal protection
clause.26 It was not until 1985, in the Sibley decision, that the
Louisiana Supreme Court embarked on an independent interpretation
of its provision.27 There, in an opinion by Justice James Dennis, a
delegate to the 1973 Constitutional Convention, the Court rejected the
federal three-tier approach to equal protection analysis and relied on
article I, section 3 to strike down a statutory cap on damages as an
unconstitutional classification based on "physical condition. '2 8
Finally, in 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down
Louisiana Associated General Contractors,29 in which it outlawed all
forms of affirmative action which take account of race. The Court
"Individual Dignity Clause" was included in the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, the
document was supported by the NAACP. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 18.
25. See, e.g., Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994); Ann L. lijima,
Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulations" or
"New Articulations "? 20 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 337 (1994); Matanuska-Susitna
Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Paul E. McGreal, Alaska
Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law? 15 Alaska L. Rev. 209
(1998); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the "Last Frontier, "Professor Gardner:
Alaska's Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 Alaska
L. Rev. 1, 11-17 (1995); Michael B. Wise, Northern Lights-Equal Protection
Analysis in Alaska, 3 Alaska L. Rev. 1 (1986); Concerned Taxpayers of Kootenai
County v. Kootenai County, 50 P.3d 991, 994 (Idaho 2002). But see Rudeen v.
Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598, 606-07 (Idaho 2001).
26. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1386 (La.
1978); Wolf, infra note 46, at 1216 n.49.
27. Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors ofLouisiana State University, 477 So. 2d 1094
(La. 1985); Michael Lester Berry, Jr., Note, Equal Protection-The Louisiana
Experience in Departingfrom GenerallyAccepted FederalAnalysis, 49 La. L. Rev.
903 (1989).
28. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1104-09.
29. 669 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1996).
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read the provision as though it was identical to California's
Proposition 209, which states that the state "shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race .... 30 The Court embraced the Individual Dignity
Clause with such zeal and enthusiasm that it literally "loved"
affirmative action options in Louisiana, and part of its equality
doctrine, "to death."
First, the Louisiana Court looked to the meaning of the word
"discriminate," finding that it was "clear and unambiguous and must
be applied as written."' This textual and "plain meaning" approach
to state constitutional interpretation has been one of the hallmarks of
the New Judicial Federalism.32 The court equated the word
"discriminate" with the word "classify," and concluded that under
circumstances where "a constitutional provision is clear and
unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, it must be applied as written without further
interpretation in search of its intent. 3 3 As John Devlin has pointed
out, however, the word "discriminate" is, under these circumstances,
ambiguous.34 In another context, he made the important point that
"'clear and unambiguous' constitutional language usually exists only
in the eye of the beholder. 35 Learned Hand put it bluntly:
There is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning
of language-be it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a
contract-than to read the words literally, forgetting the
object which the document as a whole is meant to secure.
Nor is a court ever less likely to do its duty than when, with
an obsequious show of submission, it disregards the
overriding purpose because the particular occasion which
has arisen, was not foreseen.36
30. Cal. Const. art. I, § 31 (emphasis added). See Wolf, infra note 46, at
1228-29.
31. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, 669 So. 2d at 1196.
32. G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional
Interpretation, 22 Rutgers L.J. 841, 847-48 (1991) ("[W]here . . . textual
differences were substantial, they seemed to call for independent interpretation.").
See also Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary: Some Reflections on State Constitutions,
15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 391,400 (1988) ("The presence of distinctive language or
history obviously presents the most comfortable context for relying upon
independent state grounds."); Peter Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills ofRights?,
68 Tex. L. Rev. 1573, 1584-85, 1607-08, 1610 (1990).
33. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, 669 So. 2d at 1196.
34. Devlin, supra note 5, at 904-06. See also Wolf, infra note 46, at 1220-21,
1227.
35. Devlin, infra note 55, at 730 n.193.
36. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir.
1947). The late Judge Frank expressed the same thought when he criticized "the
[Vol. 63922
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The meaning of the word "discriminate" was, of course, central to
the well-known decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
Steel Workers of America v. Weber.37 There, Justice Brennan
concluded that the word "discriminate" in Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was, in fact, ambiguous, and simply had not been used by
the Congress in 1964 to outlaw affirmative action.38 He observed the
irony of the argument against affirmative action:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's
concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to
improve the lot of those who had "been excluded from the
American dream for so long," . . . constituted the first
legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy.39
Exactly the same argument concerning irony could be made with
respect to Louisiana Associated General Contractors. The Court's
decision, turning the words of the 1974 addition to the Louisiana
Constitution against those it most likely sought to protect, was a cruel
irony indeed.
Next, the Louisiana court looked at the structure of article I, section
3. Comparing the second and third sentences, the court observed that
the ban on racial or religious discrimination had no qualifying words,
while the provision in the third sentence concerning birth, age, sex,
culture, physical condition or political ideas was qualified by the words
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.' Therefore, the court concluded,
that the second sentence outlawed all affmnative action on the basis of
race for whatever reason.4 Interestingly, this approach makes the
United States Supreme Court's decisions severely restricting
affirmative action, in Croson42 and Adarand,43 seem liberal by
comparison!
Third, despite stating that the text was "clear and unambiguous"
and therefore a search for intent was unnecessary, the Court did take a
cursory look at the constitutional history behind the provision.
one-word-one-meaning fallacy, based on the false assumption that each verbal
symbol refers to one and only one specific subject." Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial
299 (1949).
37. 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
38. Id. at 201-02, 99 S. Ct. at 2726-27.
39. Id. at 204, 99 S. Ct. at 2728. See also Wolf, infra note 46, at 1225-27.
40. Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1185,
1197-98 (La. 1996).
41. Id.
42. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
43. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2003] 923
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However, the focus of this look was occupied primarily with
demonstrating that Louisiana's Individual Dignity Clause was intended
to "give the citizens of this state greater equal protection rights than are
provided under the Fourteenth Amendment." "Greater" in what
sense? The court dismissed arguments based on differing meanings of
the word "discriminate" in a footnote.4"
The court's assessment of the constitutional history of article I,
section 3 was very selective. As has been demonstrated by the research
of Mary Anne Wolf, there was a good deal more to the constitutional
history than the court recognized.' This calls to mind the telling point
made by Justice Scalia with respect to legislative history: "Judge
Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one's friends.
47
Professor Harold Levinson has proposed standards for reliance on
the records of state constitutional deliberative proceedings. He
suggested that such materials are persuasive only if they reflect the
"collective intent" of the body, based on "an examination of the record
as a whole and a compilation of all parts of the record dealing with the
specific point being examined."48 He then proposed that the burden be
on the party relying on such materials to search the record as a whole
and that the court (with the aid of opposing counsel) independently
review the record.49
Constitutional history, or "original intent," has, together with
textualism, been another hallmark of the New Judicial Federalism.5" In
any event, despite the conclusion reached by the Court in Louisiana
Associated General Contractors, the constitutional history of article I,
section 3 does not seem to point authoritatively in either direction.
A very important state constitutional interpretation technique used
by many state courts, and used in the past by Louisiana courts,5' is to
44. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, 669 So. 2d at 1196. This was a key point
in Sibley.
45. Id. at 1199 n.12.
46. Mary Anne Wolf, Louisiana's Equal Protection Guarantee: Questions
About The Supreme CourtDecision ProhibitingAffirmative Action, 58 La. L. Rev.
1211, 1216-19 (1998).
47. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
48. L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions By Resort to the
Record, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 567, 570 (1978). See also Wolf, supra note 46, at
1223.
49. Levinson, supra note 48, at 570.
50. Tarr, supra note 32, at 848 ("If a divergent interpretation maybe justified
by reference to the distinctive origins or purpose of a provision, then state jurists
must pay particular attention to the intent of the framers and to the historical
circumstances out of which the constitutional provisions arose.").
51. Wolf, supra note 46, at 1224 n. 100.
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examine the intent of the state's voters who ratified either the revised
constitution or a specific amendment. Of course, this assessment can
be more difficult where the voters had a single vote to approve an
entire revised constitution than where they are only asked to approve
a specific amendment." This approach, referred to by the New Jersey
Supreme Court as reliance on the "voice of the people," 3 looks to a
variety of different evidence.5 4 None of this seems to have been
investigated by the Louisiana Court in Louisiana Associated General
Contractors, but it is a technique it has used in the past." Obviously,
the public perception in 1974 of what the word "discriminate" meant
would be contested,56 but it is far from obvious that the average voter
in Louisiana in 1974 would have thought that the word "discriminate"
would outlaw affirmative action. The Court provided no analysis of
newspaper coverage before the referendum in 1974 to divine what the
voters may have thought the provision would mean." The Court had
looked to this type of evidence in the past,5 8 referring to it as "'public'
intent." 9
In the states that have confronted the question, the courts prefer
the likely view or understanding of the average voter over a more
technical meaning of language gleaned from constitutional history
materials, including debates and committee reports.' Although there
are at least two Louisiana cases that appear to take this position,6 ' the
possibility does not seem to have been considered in Louisiana
Associated General Contractors.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
John Devlin has argued that the natural rights approach to
interpreting state constitutional equality clauses might have some
bearingon the question that was apparently resolved by the Louisiana
Court. Clearly, article I, section 1 ("the good of the whole") of the
52. Levinson, supra note 48, at 570.
53. Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (N.J. 1977).
54. Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: InterpretingState Constitutions
as Unique Legal Documents, 27 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 189, 194-97 (2002).
55. See City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 640
So. 2d 237, 246-47 (La. 1994); Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1165 (La.
1993); John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 683, 726-31
(1994) (citing Louisiana cases).
56. Wolf, supra note 46, at 1221.
57. Williams, supra note 54, at 196-97.
58. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 246-47, 252.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Williams, supra note 54, at 200-01.
61. City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 246-47; Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1168.
62. Devlin, supra note 5, at 912-14. Williams, supra note 6, at 1200-03. See
2003] 925
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Louisiana Constitution provides a textual springboard for this kind of
argument. In addition, it is possible that one could rely on the variety
of other equality provisions in the Louisiana Constitution, in addition
to article I, section 3, to support a generalized argument based on the
historic concerns about equality, classification and discrimination
which did not reflect any concern about classifications based on race
if they are to remedy past disadvantage. Developing such an
argument is beyond the scope of this Comment. Suffice it to say that
reasoned criticism of the Louisiana Associated General Contractors
decision is a useful enterprise not only for its academic importance
and its use in other equality cases, but also based on the possibility
that as a constitutional precedent Louisiana Associated General
Contractors is more likely to be overruled in the future than other
forms of precedent.63
V. A NEW ALTERNATIVE: STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF
FEDERALISM?
The Louisiana Supreme Court might have taken an entirely
different approach from its Louisiana Associated General
Contractors decision, or it may do so in the future. Let us assume
that the Court, rather than embracing the thrust of Croson and
Adarand, and extending it in Louisiana Associated General
Contractors, actually disagreed with those federal constitutional
interpretations and viewed the failure of the United States Supreme
Court to protect affirmative action as an abuse of national power to
the detriment of minority people, particularly those in Louisiana.
What might the Court have done?
Professor Jim Gardner has recently argued in two important
articles that state courts may act as "agents of federalism" to help
protect their state citizens from being abused by the federal
government.6 He first notes that a federal system is conceived to set
up a permanent struggle between states and the national government
notes 6-7, supra, and accompanying text. See also the Louisiana Constitution
"unenumerated rights" clause, La. Const. art. I, § 24 (1974): "[t]he enumeration in
this constitution of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights retained
by the individual citizens of the state." For an assessment of these kinds of
provisions, see Louis Karl Bonham, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State
Constitutions, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1321 (1985).
63. Williams, supra note 54, at 227-29.
64. James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and
Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1725 (2003)
[hereinafter "Power and Interpretation"]; State Constitutional Rights as Resistance
to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 92 Geo.
L.J. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter "Functional Theory"].
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as one of the mechanisms to protect the liberty of the people.6" Under
this view, states are part of a single, integrated structure set up under
the federal constitution.66 We are familiar with the federal
government, through the United States Supreme Court (as well as the
Congress and Executive), policing both the federal constitutional
limits on the federal government's authority, as well as the federal
constitutional limits on what states may do. The federal constitution,
of course, contains a number of specific restrictions on state authority
both in its original version and in the Civil War Amendments. The
state constitutions, by contrast, do not contain limitations on the
national government. Still, state legislatures and executive branch
officials have various tools, both formal and informal, for resisting
inappropriate exercises of national power. What about state courts?
Gardner argues that the state courts may serve indirectly as agents of
federalism in resisting abuses of national power by interpreting state
constitutional provisions in such a way as to enable, rather than
inhibit, the state legislative and executive branches in resisting the
abuse of national power by the Supreme Court in Croson and
Adarand. It is not obvious, and in any event is beyond the scope of
this Comment to analyze fully, whether there is anything in the
Louisiana Constitution which, through judicial interpretation, could
enable rather than inhibit the legislative and executive branches in
resisting, through various means, the outcomes in Croson and
Adarand.67 Assuming either of those branches were so inclined,
however, this illustrates Professor Gardner's first example of how
state courts can serve as agents of federalism in using their
(admittedly limited, and indirect) powers of state constitutional
interpretation to help resist perceived abuses of national power. 61
Next, Professor Gardner addresses the area of rights protections.
"State constitutional rights... can be weapons of state resistance to
national tyranny in a federal system of divided power."69 He surveys
the possibilities:
First, whenever a state court dissents from the reasoning of a
U.S. Supreme Court decision it offers a forceful and very
public critique of the national ruling, which can in the long
run influence the formation of public and, eventually, official
opinion on the propriety of the federal ruling. Second, state
65. Gardner, Power and Interpretation, supra note 64, at 1728; Functional
Theory, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. It is possible that such interpretations might have facilitated the state
legislative and executive branches in meeting the kinds of proof of prior
discrimination required to justify affirmative action under Croson and Adarand.
68. Gardner, Functional Theory, supra note 64.
69. Id.
2003) 927
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constitutional rulings that depart from or criticize U.S.
Supreme Court precedents can contribute to the establishment
of a nationwide legal consensus at the state level, a factor
which the Supreme Court sometimes considers in the course
of its own constitutional decision making. Third, generous
state interpretations of individual rights can more directly
check national power by prohibiting state and local
governments from exercising authority permitted them under
the U.S. Constitution to suppress certain kinds of private
behavior. In so doing, state courts create spaces in which
otherwise prohibitable behavior may flourish. Finally, rights-
protective rulings by state courts can help ameliorate the harm
to liberty caused by narrow national rulings by providing
protection for second-best alternatives to the types ofbehavior
that such national rulings permit governments to suppress.70
These possibilities, however, are quite limited in the Croson and
Adarand situations because those cases found that the federal
constitutional rights ofnonminorities were violated by the affirmative
action programs. They still may be seen by state courts as abuses of
national power in terms of their impact on minorities. Gardner notes:
[W]hen we think about tyranny perpetrated by the national
government, we tend to think about rights-invasive ...
abuses.., by the legislative and executive branches. But
liberty can also be abused by thejudicial branch, most notably
when federal courts refuse to acknowledge and accord
protection to individual rights possessed by the people of the
United States.7'
Of course, in Croson and Adarand the Supreme Court did not refuse
to recognize rights, but rather it mandated protection ofnonminorities
at the expense ofminorities. Therefore, in Gardner's terms, "national
standards prevail and there may be nothing states can do to limit their
impact on the activities subject to federal regulatory standards. 72
It may be possible for the state government to ameliorate that
harm indirectly by using its lawful powers to expand and
protect liberty in other directions. One important way in
which the state can accomplish that objective is by providing
70. Id. at (working draft p.6).
71. Id. at (working draft p.44).
72. Id. at (working draft p.67). "A state that views such an exercise of national
power as an abusive invasion of liberty has at its disposal no fully legal means to
undo directly the particular harm comnritted by the national government. A lawful
exercise of national power, backed by the Supremacy Clause and the threat of
enforcement, is enough to make that harm stick."
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heightened protection under the state constitution to other
liberties that are related to the liberty that national power has
denied, or which might in some circumstances plausibly
substitute for it.73
Professor Gardner continues his explanation by using the United
States Supreme Court's approach to affirmative action, including
Croson and Adarand, as an example, noting the sharp restriction
those decisions imposed on laws providing employment preferences
for minorities. Under these circumstances, the "entire field of racial
relations is so hemmed in on all sides by national law that it may
prove exceedingly difficult for a state to counteract a national
contraction of liberty by expanding liberty in any directly related
area. ' '74  As a second-best alternative, then, Professor Gardner
suggests that the state constitution could be interpreted to "confer
upon minorities some kind of right to noneconomic opportunities,
such as cultural integrity or cultural expression."'75 He presents this
as an admittedly second-best, indirect response, but as an example of
"state power.., asserting itself against national power in the only
way it can. ' 7
Interestingly, Louisiana has one of the few, if not the only, state
constitutions with explicit protection for "culture." Article I, section
3, the "Individual Dignity Clause," provides, inter alia, "[n]o law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a
person because birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political
ideas or affiliation. 77 In addition, article XII, section 4 provides:
"[t]he right of the people to preserve, foster, and promote their
respective historic, linguistic and cultural origins is recognized. 7 8
The leading commentator on the Louisiana Constitution notes that the
1974 discussions of these provisions centered on Francophone culture
and language.79 He states that the latter provision was originally
rejected in committee because of its "imprecision and ambiguity.""
It was adopted, however, by a 95-1 vote as a floor amendment,
leading Professor Hargrave to observe: "[t]he language, however, is
broad, giving an activist court a basis to protect what it will develop
73. Id. at (working draft p.68).
74. Id.
75. Id., citing Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of
Minority Rights (1995).
76. Id. at (working draft p.75).
77. La. Const. art. I, § 3 (1974) (emphasis added).
78. La. Cost. art. XII, § 4 (1974) (emphasis added).
79. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 25, 187. For a recent analysis of Louisiana's
state constitutional culture, see James T. McHugh, Ex Uno Plura: State
Constitutions and Their Political Cultures 135-60 (2003).
80. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 187.
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on a case-by-case basis as cultural and linguistic rights."' Clearly
the language is broad enough to support judicial protection of cultural
and linguistic preferences of racial and other minorities. It is, of
course, judicial activism, explicitly as a negative reaction to narrow
United States Supreme Court decisions, that Professor Gardner
advocates.
Gardner suggests that state constitutional interpretation
techniques be expanded to include explicit consideration of whether
there has been an abuse of national power by the United States
Supreme Court through its interpretation of the federal constitution."
By treating state power as having an essential function
derived in part from the national structure of federalism, the
functional approach recognizes that state power always exists
in relation to national power and never in isolation from it. A
state constitution is a document fundamentally ordering the
exercise of state power. Consequently, a state constitution
must generally be interpreted with one eye on the U.S.
Constitution and on the actions of the national government
taken in reliance on it. Only by monitoring the operation of
the national government can any organ of state government
fulfill its responsibility to discover and resist abuses of
national power. Certainly, the national government will be
watching the state. Federalism requires that this practice be
reciprocal. Where individual rights are concerned, this means
that state courts should always be prepared to exercise
independent judgment about the propriety of U.S. Supreme
Court rulings, and, when appropriate, to resist and work to
undermine those rulings of which they disapprove.8 3
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Associated
General Contractors contained no apparent consideration of the
correctness of the United States Supreme Court's Croson and
Adarand decisions. Had the majority of the Court considered those
decisions to be incorrect interpretations of the federal constitution-
abuses of national power by the Supreme Court-Louisiana
Associated General Contractors would not have come out the way it
did, closing off what little state constitutional space was left for
affirmative action. In addition, the Louisiana Court could
compensate partially for the irresistible reach of Croson and Adarand
by construing other, related rights such as the protection of culture,
broadly for the benefit of minorities. These perspectives offered by
81. Id. at 187-88 (emphasis added).
82. Gardner, Functional Theory, supra note 64, at (working draft p.80).
83. Id. at (working draft p.82).
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Professor Gardner demonstrate an entirely new range of options
available to a state court in similar circumstances, and even possibly
to the Louisiana Supreme Court in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, these brief observations on Louisiana Associated
General Contractors specifically, and on state constitutional law
more generally, will shed some light on Louisiana constitutional law,
which has a very important role to play in protecting rights as an
integral part of our system of constitutional federalism.

